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I. Introduction
The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation1 (NAAEC), negotiated by Canada, Mexico, and the
United States in the early 1990’s as part of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 discussions, has been called a
“unique, highly innovative agreement....”3 The institution it

†

David L. Markell, Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of
Law. Professors John Knox, Kal Raustiala, Robert Glicksman, and Dan Tarlock, and
Geoff Garver of the CEC, provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Sarah Lindquist, FSU College of Law ’06, provided excellent research assistance.
Although the author previously served as Director of the CEC’s Submissions on
Enforcement Matters Unit and also as a consultant to the CEC, the views expressed here
are entirely his own and should not be attributed to the CEC, including its Secretariat.
This Article is an updated and expanded version of David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen
Submissions Process: On or Off Course, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, (David L. Markell & John H. Knox
eds., 2003). Reprinted with permission of the publisher, http://www.sup.org.
1 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, art.
8-19, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32
I.L.M. 289. For a more in-depth review of the history of the negotiations, see NAFTA
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995); PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ
BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996).

TEN-YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM’N., COMM’N. FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
TEN YEARS OF NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 4 (2004).
3
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spawned, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
has been termed a “brave experiment in institution-building.”4
Among other things, the CEC: (1) is the “first international
organization created to address the environmental aspects of
economic integration;” (2) has “innovative tools and almost
unlimited jurisdiction to address regional environmental
problems;” and, (3) “provides unprecedented opportunities for
participation by civil society at the international level.”5
The citizen submissions process that Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC establish is a critical part of the CEC.
The
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has characterized the process
as “[b]y far the most innovative and substantial mechanism
created within the NAAEC for fostering transparency and public
participation....”6 The process, described in more detail below,7
allows citizens to direct a spotlight on domestic government
enforcement practices in order to promote enhanced enforcement
and, ultimately, improved environmental protection.8
As
Professor Kal Raustiala has pointed out, the process gives citizens
an unusually prominent role in international governance because it
serves as a “fire alarm” type of “review institution;” it allows
citizens to initiate claims concerning assertedly ineffective state
performance.9 The process is a variation of what Professor Cass
Sunstein has referred to as “informational regulation”— that is,
regulation intended to promote effective implementation through
4

Id.

GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 2 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter GREENING
NAFTA].
5

6 ENVTL. L. INST., RESEARCH REPORT: ISSUES RELATING TO ARTS. 14 & 15 OF THE
N. AM. AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 4 (2003).
7

See infra Part II for a description of the citizen submission process.

See David L. Markell, The Citizen Spotlight Process, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.-Apr.
2001, at 32, 33.
8

9 Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols and Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 50 LOYOLA L.
REV. 389, 396 (2005) (Professor Raustiala, among others, has contrasted “fire alarm”
mechanisms with “police patrol” approaches, which empower government authorities to
undertake such reviews). Professor John Knox, relatedly, suggests that the CEC
represents a significant step away from a “Westphalian world” by empowering citizens
to monitor Parties’ obligations under the NAAEC to effectively enforce their
environmental laws.
John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American
Agreements on Labor and the Environment, 50 LOYOLA L. REV. 373 (2005).
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relatively “soft,” non-coercive approaches, rather than through
conventional “command-and-control” strategies.10 As such, it
represents an experiment with a relatively new tool for promoting
compliance with the environmental laws.11 Particularly because of
the innovative features or characteristics of the citizen submissions
process, the CEC’s implementation of the process to date provides
fertile soil for policymakers, members of “civil society,”12
academics, and others interested in international governance and
environmental protection.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the citizen
submissions process. In doing so, it focuses specific attention on
the issue of jurisdictional boundaries among key actors in the
process, notably the CEC Council, the CEC Secretariat, and
members of the public.13 The allocation of authority for the
implementation of international regimes is obviously of
considerable importance as we experiment with new forms of
global governance.
Part III reviews four Resolutions that the CEC Council has
issued relating to the CEC’s “factual record” process.14 For a
variety of reasons, these Resolutions are especially important
milestones in the history of the citizen submissions process,
10 Cass R. Sunstein, Information Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-26 (1999).
See generally CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT &
THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 59-83, 213-67 (2003) (discussing different strategies
for promoting environmental compliance). The focus of the CEC process, which is
intended to be primarily on government performance, obviously differs from the focus of
information regulation practices that are directed toward influencing regulated party
behavior.
11 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE, OTA-ENV-634 130-31 (1995).
12 One observer suggests that “civil society” is “the ensemble of non-state
organizations and relations that constitute associational life.” Jesse C. Ribot,
Representation and Accountability in Decentralized Sahelian Forestry: Legal
Instruments of Political-Administrative Control, 12 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 447, 454 n.24
(2000). Ann Florini defines “civil society” as “[t]he private sector and the amorphous
third sector of non-governmental organizations” and notes that they are “becoming key
figures in transnational governance . . . .” ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW
RULES FOR RUNNING A NEW WORLD 15 (2003).
13

See infra Part II.

The CEC Council is comprised of the environmental ministers of the three
signatory Parties. See infra Part III.
14
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especially in terms of the issue of jurisdictional boundaries.15
Part IV offers some thoughts about the possible consequences
of these Council Resolutions for the future of the citizen
submissions process. It suggests that the Resolutions’ possible
accretion of power to the CEC Council has the potential to
undermine the credibility of the process and the interest of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in continuing to use the
process. Part IV also identifies some of the issues the CEC
experience raises for regional and global governance more
generally.
II. The Citizen Submissions Process: An Overview and the
Issue of Jurisdictional Boundaries Among Key Actors
The NAAEC citizen submissions process is an international
spotlight that is intended to shine on and, thereby, invigorate the
domestic environmental enforcement practices of Canada, Mexico,
and the United States.16 The expectation is that invigorated
enforcement of the environmental laws will improve compliance
with these laws and, thereby, engender higher levels of
environmental protection.17
Such a spotlight might be expected to have and, indeed, has
had, two effects on its core constituencies. It has created
expectations for interested citizens and NGOs by providing a new
international forum to engage domestic government officials and
highlight concerns about domestic governance.18 It also has
15

See infra Part III.

16

Markell, supra note 8, at 33.

See, e.g., North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note
1, art. 5(1). In describing what the citizen submissions process is, it is important to
explain what it is not. Among other things, it is not intended to serve as a forum for
complaining about domestic environmental governance in the arena of standard-setting.
That is, the process is clearly confined to allegations that a government is failing to
effectively enforce an environmental law; allegations that the laws themselves are flawed
(e.g., because they fail to adequately serve particular environmental values) are off-limits
for the process. See Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) on the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (CEC, A14/SEM/98-003/03/14(1), 1998);
David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission
Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 553-55 (2000).
17

18 Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles
14 and 15 of the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 26
LOYOLA L. REV. 415 (2005). For a review of some of the reasons why this forum may
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created apprehension on the part of the NAAEC Parties that are its
potential targets (and creators).19
A key issue in the operation of the NAAEC citizen
submissions process involves the scope of the authority of each of
the main actors: the CEC Council (comprised of the environmental
ministers of the three Parties);20 interested citizens (“civil
society”);21 and a Secretariat created under the NAAEC to assist in
implementation of the citizen submissions process, among other
responsibilities.22 It is clear that in creating the NAAEC, the
Parties intended to retain an important role in the implementation
of the citizen submissions process, vesting considerable power in
the CEC Council.23 In creating the process, however, the Parties
also assigned a substantial role to citizens of the three North
American countries by empowering them to start the spotlighting
process and, thereby, influence where the spotlight will shine (the
process is launched with the filing of a citizen complaint, called a
submission).24 In addition, the NAAEC empowers citizens to
contribute information about the nature and effectiveness of the
government enforcement practices at issue in particular
submissions.25
The NAAEC, similarly, created a Secretariat to administer the
citizen submissions spotlighting process, and the Agreement
vested in the CEC Secretariat considerable authority over
administration of the process. Under the NAAEC’s division of
be of particular interest and value to NGOs, as well as some of the arguable
shortcomings in the process, see Markell, supra note 8, at 32.
19 For a discussion of the pressures that led the Parties to create the process despite
its potential to embarrass them, see Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty
Review in NAAEC, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 5, at 256.
20

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1.

21

See supra note 12 for a discussion concerning the definition of “civil society.”

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
14, 15. In addition to the actors referenced in the text, the Joint Public Advisory
Committee (JPAC) plays a role in the citizen submissions process. See John D. Wirth,
Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note
5 at 199.
22

23

See infra Part III.

24

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.

25

Id. art. 15.

14.
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responsibilities, it is the Secretariat’s job to conduct the initial
review of a submission and decide, based on a variety of factors
contained in NAAEC Article 14(1) and (2), whether to reject the
submission or to ask the targeted country for a response.26 Article
14(2)(b), for example, directs the Secretariat to consider whether
the submission “raises matters whose further study in [the citizen
submissions] process would advance the goals of this
Agreement....”27 If the Secretariat determines that a submission
does not warrant further review, based on the Secretariat’s
consideration of the submission in light of the Article 14(1) and
(2) factors, the Secretariat unilaterally may dismiss the
submission. The Secretariat has exercised this initial review or
filtering responsibility under Article 14(1) and (2) fairly
rigorously: during the CEC’s first ten plus years (through February
15, 2005), the Secretariat has either terminated or notified
submitters of the need to revise twenty-three submissions under
Article 14(1) or (2), out of a total of fifty submissions filed.28
For submissions that survive the Secretariat’s Article 14(1) and
(2) filtering process, it is the Secretariat’s responsibility both to
request a response from the Party and to review the submission in
light of any such response.29 The Secretariat then determines
whether to notify the Council that, in the Secretariat’s view, it
26 For more complete summaries of the citizen submissions process, see, e.g., John
H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(2001); Markell, supra note 17.

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
14(2)(b).
27

28 Of these twenty-three submissions, sixteen were ultimately terminated because
no revised submissions were received within thirty days after the request or the
Secretariat determined that the revised submission still did not meet Article 14
requirements. In one submission – Coal-Fired Power Plants – the Secretariat has
received a revised submission but has not determined if the revised submission meets the
Article 14(1) requirements. Additionally, under Guideline 3.10 the Secretariat has
requested that the submitters of four submissions fix “minor errors” in their submissions
before proceeding with the Article 14 analysis. The Secretariat is currently reviewing
submission number 50 – Crushed Gravel in Puerto Rico – for compliance with these
Article 14 provisions.
All information regarding the procedural status of the
submissions was found using the “Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters” link at
the CEC website, http://www.cec.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
15(1). Thus far, the Parties uniformly have provided such responses.
29
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would be appropriate under the NAAEC to prepare a “factual
record.”30 The Secretariat may unilaterally dismiss a submission
at this stage if it determines that a factual record is not warranted.31
In either case (a recommendation to proceed with a factual record
or a dismissal), the Secretariat must explain the rationale for its
decision.32 As of February 15, 2005, the Secretariat had made
eighteen recommendations to the Council that a factual record is
warranted and dismissed eleven submissions after receiving a
Party’s response.33
The process creates specific “checks” that the Council may
exercise at particular stages in the citizen submissions process.
Thus, the NAAEC creates a “check” for the Council for
submissions for which the Secretariat believes development of a
factual record is warranted, as indicated above. Instead of
allowing the Secretariat to unilaterally determine to proceed with
the preparation of a factual record, Article 15(2) of the NAAEC
empowers the Council, after it receives the Secretariat’s
Recommendation, to decide whether to authorize the Secretariat to
prepare a factual record.34 A potentially important feature of this
30 Id. Factual records are the endpoint of the citizen submission process and
provide information about the nature of the Party’s enforcement practices at issue and
about the effectiveness of those enforcement practices. Id.
31 See id.; Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (C/9900/RES/07/Rev.3Council Res. 99-06), at No. 9.6 (June 28, 1999), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/99-06e_EN.pdf (“If the Secretariat considers
that the submission, in light of any response provided by the Party, does not warrant
development of a factual record . . . the submission process is terminated with respect to
that submission”).
32 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
15(1) (recommendation to proceed with a factual record); Guidelines for Submissions on
Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, supra note 31.

The CEC provides the final determination of each submission in its “Citizen
Submissions on Enforcement Matters” link on its webpage, www.cec.org. Additionally,
as of December 31, 2004, two submissions were withdrawn by the submitters before the
Secretariat decided whether to recommend a factual record or dismiss the submission,
and two submissions are pending either as a response from the government or a decision
by the Secretariat.
33

34 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
15(2) (“The Secretariat shall prepare a factual record if the Council, by a two-thirds vote,
instructs it to do so”) (emphasis added).
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check is that only a two-thirds vote of the Parties is required to go
forward with the preparation of such a record.35 Thus, the Party
that is the focus of the submission cannot unilaterally terminate the
process at this stage. As of February 15, 2005, the Council has
directed the Secretariat to develop factual records for fourteen
submissions and has issued two Resolutions in which it rejected
the Secretariat’s recommendation and, instead, dismissed the
submission.36
If the Council directs the Secretariat to go forward with the
development of a factual record, the Secretariat has the
opportunity and responsibility to develop information relating to
the allegations in the submission of a failure to effectively enforce
and then to prepare a draft factual record that contains the results
of its investigative work. Article 15(4) of the Agreement
authorizes the Secretariat to consider “any relevant technical,
scientific or other information” that is: (1) publicly available; (2)
submitted by interested non-governmental organizations or
persons; (3) submitted by the JPAC; or, (4) developed by the
Secretariat or by independent experts.37 The Agreement also
specifies that the Secretariat shall consider any information

35

Id.

Council Resolution 02-13 (May 16, 2000) (Cytrar II Submission); Instruction to
the Secretariat of the Commission of Environmental Cooperation Regarding the
Assertion that Mexico is Failing to Effectively Enforce Its Environmental Law in
Relation to the Establishment and Operation of Cytrar Hazardous Waste Landfill, in the
city of Hermosillo, Senora, Mexico (Dec 10, 2002) (C/C.01/02-06/02-13/RES/Final),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/01-1-Res-E.pdf; Instruction to the
Secretariat of the Commission of Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion
that Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce Certain Environmental Protection
Standards Regarding the Agricultural Pollution Emanating from Livestock Operations
(SEM-97-003) (Quebec Hogs submission) (C/C.01/00-04/RES/01/Rev.03), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-3-res-e.pdf. The Quebec Hogs submission was
dismissed by a 2-1 vote, with the United States voting to proceed with a factual record
and Canada and Mexico voting to dismiss, and the Cytrar II Submission was dismissed
by a unanimous vote.
The Council, in another May 16, 2000 Resolution (Council
Resolution #00-02), deferred consideration of the Oldman River submission (in one of
the November 16, 2001 Resolutions discussed in more detail below, the Council voted to
go forward with a factual record for this submission). Decision by Council Regarding
Submission on Enforcement Matters (May 16, 2000) (SEM-97-006) C/C.01/0004/RES/02, available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/00-02e_EN.pdf.
36

37

15(4).

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
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provided by a Party.38 Another provision in the NAAEC, Article
21, gives the Secretariat authority to obtain information from the
Parties,39 and Article 11(4) forbids unilateral Party efforts to
influence the Secretariat in the performance of its
responsibilities.40
The process creates two Party “checks” on the Secretariat’s
authority following the Secretariat’s preparation of a draft factual
record. First, the NAAEC requires that the Secretariat submit
draft factual records to the Council, and it authorizes each Party to
provide comments to the Secretariat on the draft.41 An important
limitation on this Party “check” is that the Agreement specifies
that Parties’ comments must be confined to the “accuracy” of the
draft.42 An additional limitation on this Party “check” is that the
Agreement does not obligate the Secretariat to incorporate even
these narrowly focused comments. Instead, it simply requires that
the Secretariat take such comments into account, when
appropriate.43
After the Secretariat considers the Parties’ comments and
incorporates them as it deems appropriate into a final factual
record, the Parties’ final “check” is that the Secretariat submits the
final factual record to the Council, leaving it to the Council to
determine whether to release it to the public (again, a two-thirds
vote of the Council members is required to make a final factual
record public).44 As of December 31, 2004, the Secretariat has
submitted ten final factual records to the Council, and the Council
in each case has unanimously approved their release.45
This review of the citizen submissions process is intended to

38

Id.

39

Id. art. 21.

40

Id. art 11(4).

41

Id. art. 15(5).

42

Id.

43

Id. art. 15(6).

44

Id.

Final Factual Records have been released for: Aquanova, BC Hydro, BC
Logging, BC Mining, Cozumel, Metales y Derivados, Migratory Birds, Oldman River II,
Rio Magdalena, and Molymex II. The final Factual Records are available through the
“Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters” link of the CEC website at
http://www.cec.org.
45
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suggest that an important feature of the process is its allocation of
authority and responsibility among the Parties, civil society, and
the Secretariat–its creation of “jurisdictional boundaries” that
establish the respective parameters for action by the different
actors in the process.46 The considerable tension and acrimony
that this question of boundaries has spawned during the early years
of the process is evidence of the importance that many attach to its
resolution.47 A common theme of the NGO community and of
scholarly commentary has been that the NAAEC’s allocation of
authority limits the authority of the Council to some degree by
creating an independent role for the Secretariat and an important
role for citizens.48 Numerous NGOs and commentators have
further suggested that the Council has fallen short in respecting
limits on its authority and that, for the process to operate as
intended (and for it to be credible with the members of civil
society), the Council needs to do a better job of adhering to the
self-imposed limits contained in the NAAEC and accord
appropriate respect to the integral roles of the Secretariat and
citizens in the process.49
This issue has received the most attention in the context of the
four Resolutions the Council issued in November 2001, in which
the Council directed the Secretariat to prepare factual records with
respect to four submissions. Part III reviews these Resolutions in

46 This Article does not suggest that any particular allocation of power is
appropriate but, instead, focuses on the nature of the allocation the Parties seemed to
create in the NAAEC and the extent to which they have implemented this allocation. Cf.
CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 8 (2001).
47 Some early commentators anticipated these tensions. See, e.g., FOUR-YEAR
REVIEW OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION:
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (June 1998). Numerous observers
have commented on their presence. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger
Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2001); Knox, supra note 26; Raustiala, supra note 9; Christopher
Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under
the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 175 (2002).

See, e.g., Wold et al., supra note 18; ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 13; TENYEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM., supra note 3, at 45; JPAC Advice to Council, no. 0107, Oct. 23, 2001, JPAC Advice to Council, n. 03-05, Dec. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.cec.org.
48

49

See supra notes 47 & 48, and the sources cited therein.
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some detail.
III. The Four Council Resolutions
This Article focuses on the allocation of authority or
jurisdictional boundaries issue in the particular context of four
Resolutions that the CEC Council issued on November 16, 2001,
in which the Council directed the CEC Secretariat to prepare
factual records in connection with four citizen submissions.50 The
Council’s issuance of these Resolutions to develop factual records
represents an important milestone in the formative years of the
citizen submissions process. Through these Resolutions, the
Council authorized preparation of more factual records than it had
directed to be developed during the first seven years of the
process.51 The importance of these Council actions for the
direction and credibility of the process is magnified because
factual records are at the heart of the citizen submissions
spotlighting process. They serve as its primary and most in-depth
spotlighting mechanism.
See Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for the Environmental
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that the Government of the US is Failing to
Effectively Enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (SEM-99-002) (C/C.01/0106/RES/04/Final)
(Nov.
16,
2001),
available
at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-10e.pdf; Instruction to the Secretariat of
the Commission for Environmental cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Canada Is
Failing to Effectively Enforce Section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act (SEM-98-004) (C/C.0106/RES/05/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/
COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf; Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Canada Is Failing to Effectively
Enforce Sections 35 (1) and 36(3) of the Fisheries Act (SEM-98-004) (C/C.0106/RES/02/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/
pdf/COUNCIL/res01-12e.pdf. The Council actually issued five Resolutions on that
date, but the fifth, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Mexico Is Failing to Effectively Enforce
Provisions of Its General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection,
Forestry Law, Mexican Official Standard NOM-)62-ECOL-1994 and NOM-059-ECOL1994, The Law of National Waters and Its Regulations, the Fisheries Law and Its
Regulations and the Federal Criminal Code with Respect to the Activities of Granjas
Aquanova (SEM-98-006) (C/C.01/01-06/RES/01/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-09e.pdf, does not raise the issues
addressed in this Article and will, therefore, not be discussed.
50

51 Before November 2001, the Council had authorized the preparation of only three
factual records. David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen Submissions Process, in GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 5 at 274, 294 n.7 & app.
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The Resolutions’ importance as potential indicators of the
prospects for the citizen submissions process is heightened by the
fact that one of the Resolutions involves the first Secretariat
recommendation to develop a factual record involving the United
States and, therefore, the first occasion for the Council to consider
such a recommendation. The United States had been the only
Party that had not yet voted to reject a Secretariat
recommendation, and the public and, most likely, the other Parties
were interested in learning whether the United States’ support for
the citizen submissions process would remain firm even when the
spotlight would be on its own enforcement practices. In 1994, the
United States had issued an Executive Order in which the
President committed to vote in favor of Secretariat
recommendations except in extremely limited circumstances.52
The recommendation focusing on U.S. enforcement practices
arguably put this Order to a stricter test than the recommendations
that had preceded it.
At a superficial level, the Resolutions suggest a congruity of
views among Council, Secretariat, and submitters about factual
records. In each Resolution, the Council agreed with the
Secretariat’s recommendation, and the submission itself, that a
factual record should be developed.53 But, this superficial
congruity of views disappears upon closer examination of the
Resolutions. A wide chasm becomes evident.
The four Council Resolutions dramatically changed the focus
of the factual records that the submitters requested and that the
Secretariat recommended by substantially limiting or redefining
the scope of the factual records to be developed. While the
submitters asserted that broad, programmatic failures to effectively

52 “To the greatest extent practicable, pursuant to Articles 15(1) and 15(2), where
the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (“Secretariat”)
informs the Council that a factual record is warranted, the United States shall support the
presentation of such factual record.” Exec. Order No. 12915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25775 (May
18, 1994).

See Oldman River, Council Res. 01-08 (2001), available at http://
www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf; Migratory Birds, Council Res. 01-10
(2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-10e.pdf; B.C.
Mining, Council Res. 01-11 (2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/
COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf; B.C. Logging, Council Res. 01-12 (2001), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res01-12e.pdf.
53
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enforce particular environmental laws existed,54 and while the
Secretariat recommended that these asserted widespread failures to
effectively enforce be investigated through development of factual
records,55 the Council Resolutions declined to direct the Secretariat
to develop factual records on such broad, programmatic alleged
failures to effectively enforce. Instead, the Resolutions directed
the Secretariat to develop factual records concerning some of the
isolated examples of asserted failures to effectively enforce that
the submitters had included as illustrations of the broader
failures.56
54 See ALLIANCE FOR THE WORLD ROCKIES ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 14 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 11-12 (CEC, A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB,
1999) (suggesting that the U. S. failure to enforce the Migratory Bird Act was
nationwide in scope), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf;
SIERRA CLUB OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA’S FAILURE TO
ENFORCE THE FISHERIES ACT AGAINST MINING COMPANIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: A
SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 14 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 6,
12-13 (1998) (asserting ineffective Canadian enforcement of the Fisheries Act against
mining
operations,
on
a
widespread
basis),
available
at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-SUB-E.pdf; DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION ET AL.,
SUBMISSION PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 12-13 (2000) (similarly asserting a broad-based
Canadian failure to effectively enforce the Fisheries Act, in this case against the logging
industry), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/00-4-SUB-E.pdf.; THE FRIENDS
OF THE OLDMAN RIVER, NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION ARTICLE 14 SUBMISSION (1997) (alleging a widespread failure to
effectively enforce the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-SUB-E.pdf.
ON

55 See SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF
NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 15(1) NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A
FACTUAL RECORD IS WARRANTED (2001) (B.C. Logging), available at http://www.
cec.org/files/pdf/sem/00-4-ADV-E.PDF; SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 15(1) NOTIFICATION TO
COUNCIL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS WARRANTED (2001) (B.C.
Mining), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-ADV-E.PDF; SECRETARIAT
OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE
15(1) NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS
WARRANTED (2001) (Migratory Birds), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/
sem/99-2-ADV-E.PDF; SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 15(1) NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT
DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS WARRANTED (1999) (Oldman River), available
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-ADV-E.PDF.
56

See supra note 53.
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The Migratory Birds submission is a good example.57 The
Secretariat recommended that a factual record be prepared
concerning the alleged failure of the United States to enforce the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) on a nationwide basis.58 The
Secretariat’s recommendation provided no indication at all that the
Secretariat thought that it would be useful to develop a factual
record limited to two isolated instances of alleged failures to
effectively enforce the MBTA, as the Council ultimately directed
in its Resolution.59 The submitters devoted a single paragraph to
these two instances in their submission,60 the United States did not
even mention the two alleged examples in its response,61 and the
Secretariat devoted little attention to them in its recommendation.62
Further, the questions highlighted in the Secretariat’s
recommendation as warranting in-depth review in a factual record
focused almost entirely on the broad alleged failure to enforce the
MBTA effectively. For example, it recommended a review of the
overall numbers of migratory birds killed in logging operations
(operations for which the United States conceded it does not
enforce the MBTA), compared to the numbers killed through
activities for which the United States does take enforcement
action.63
Thus, by directing the Secretariat to develop a factual record
that focuses on two isolated instances of asserted failures to
effectively enforce, the Council may well have directed the
Secretariat to prepare a factual record even though the Secretariat
itself would have determined that a factual record that focused
only on these isolated incidents was not warranted.64 Many of the
See Migratory Birds Submission (CEC, A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB, 1999),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf.
57

58 See Migratory Birds Recommendation (CEC, A14/SEM/99-002/11/AVD),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA30.pdf.
59

See supra notes 57 & 58.

60

See supra note 57.

Migratory Birds Party Response (CEC, A14/SEM/99-002/04/RSP), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF1842.PDF
61

62
63

See supra note 58.
Id.

See infra note 71 and accompanying text. A related question, not addressed
in detail here, is how much the Council may depart from a submission in
directing the preparation of a factual record. The submitters for the four
64
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issues that the submission raised, which the Secretariat believed
warranted development of a factual record, may be beyond the
scope of the Council Resolution.65 One of the lawyers for the
submitters has stated specifically that the submitters would not
have gone forward on this basis.66
A February 2002 memorandum from the Director of the CEC
Secretariat’s Submissions Unit to the Chair of the Joint Public
Advisory Committee (JPAC) acknowledged the limiting effect of
the Resolutions:
[T]he Council included instructions [in the four Resolutions] to
prepare factual records regarding specific cases raised in the
submissions, but did not include instructions regarding
allegations in each of those submissions of widespread failures
to effectively enforce environmental laws. For each of those
four submissions, the Secretariat had recommended preparing
factual records in regard to the widespread allegations of failures
to effectively enforce.67

The CEC’s final Factual Record for each of the submissions
echoes the conclusion that the Council Resolutions dramatically
narrowed the scope of broad “pattern-type” submissions by
authorizing factual records focused on isolated instances of alleged
ineffectual enforcement. Each Factual Record contains the
following language: “In light of this instruction [from the Council,
in the Resolution authorizing the preparation of a Factual Record],
the scope of this factual record is different from the scope in the
submission and the factual record that the Secretariat considered to
warrant development in its Article 15(1) notification.”68
submissions discussed in the text uniformly opposed the Council’s decision to
narrow the factual records. See, e.g., Letter from Sierra Legal Defense Fund to
Joint Public Advisory Committee (Sept. 8, 2003), reprinted in ENVTL. L. INST.,
supra note 6; see also WOLD ET AL., INT’L. ENVTL. L. PROJECT, COMMENTS ON
ISSUES RELATING TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 3-7 (Oct. 2, 2003), reprinted in ENVTL. L.
INST, supra note 6.
65

See supra note 63, and accompanying text.

66

See infra notes 72-74, and accompanying text.

Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Director of Submissions on Enforcement
Matters Unit, to Jon Plaut, Chair of Joint Public Advisory Committee (Feb. 15, 2002),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/SEM/Memo-Garver-e.pdf.
67

68 See Factual Record: BC Mining Submission (SEM-98-004), at 17, available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-FFR_en.pdf; Factual Record: BC Logging
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In its 2003 report, ELI similarly concludes that in each of the
four Resolutions, the Council significantly limited the scope of the
factual records that the Secretariat was to prepare, compared to the
scope requested in the submissions and recommended in the
Secretariat Recommendations:
In each of these [BC Mining, BC Logging, Migratory Birds, and
Oldman River II] cases, the Secretariat recommended to the
Council that a factual record be developed to investigate alleged
widespread, systematic failures of a Party to effectively enforce
its environmental law. Although the Council approved the
preparation of factual records with respect to each of these
submissions, it significantly narrowed the scope of the
investigation. That is, rather than order preparation of factual
records on the alleged widespread failure to effectively enforce,
it instructed the Secretariat to develop factual records
concerning only specific examples of the alleged widespread
failure that were detailed in the submission. This represented
the first time the CEC Council had used its approval authority
under the NAAEC to narrow the substantive scope of the factual
records.69
Submission (SEM-00-004), at 21, available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/00-4FFR_en.pdf; Final Factual Record: Migratory Birds Submission (SEM 99-002), at 18,
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/MigratoryBirds-FFR_EN.pdf; Factual
Record: Oldman River II Submission (SEM 97-006), at 17, available at http://www.cec.
org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-FFR_en.pdf.
The submitters registered the same criticisms
concerning the narrowing of the scope of the Factual Records. See, e.g., infra notes 7075. The submitter of the Oldman River II Submission, Martha Kostuch, echoed the
CEC’s description of the Council Resolution as a significant modification of the type of
factual record sought by the submitters and recommended by the Secretariat:
The Secretariat [in its Recommendation] also understood that [Friends of the
Oldman River’s] submission dealt with the general failure of the Government of
Canada to enforce the Fisheries Act and CEAA and not a specific case. FOR’s
submission alleges a general failure to enforce the Fisheries Act and CEAA, not
a failure in relation to any specific case.
COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, WRITTEN COMMENTS ON THE PUBLIC HISTORY OF
SUBMISSIONS MADE UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT
ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (Nov. 14, 2000).
69 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6. For summaries of the ways in which the Council
Resolutions narrowed the scope of the Submissions and Recommendations, see id. at 58; see also Markell, supra note 51, at 277-80. The TRAC similarly notes that the
Council has “adopted a series of measures over the years to narrow the process’s scope”
and cites specifically to “disallowing examination of allegations of a broad pattern of
ineffective enforcement in several factual records” and “limiting the scope of factual
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The Council’s Resolutions have at least three important
implications for the factual record process and for the division of
authority for its implementation. First, the practical reality of the
Council Resolutions is that by authorizing factual records that are
limited to specific alleged failures to effectively enforce, the
Council dramatically changed the types of alleged enforcement
failures to be addressed in the factual records. ELI makes the
point that the Council’s narrowing of the scope of the factual
records dramatically changed the nature of the Factual Records the
Secretariat was able to develop for the four submissions for which
the Council issued its November 2001 Resolutions by excluding
various issues from the Secretariat’s consideration. ELI states:
[T]he submissions were largely prompted by the concerns about
broad enforcement issues–such as the allocation of staff and
resources for enforcement, use and effectiveness of compliance
assistance programs, use and effectiveness of traditional
enforcement tools, and policies regarding when state or
provincial enforcement action may preclude federal
enforcement. Although the Secretariat... identified these issues
as “central questions” in its determinations, it is precisely these
issues that have been excluded by the Council from the scope of
the factual record[s].70

A second important aspect of the Council’s actions in its
Resolutions is that it is by no means clear for any of the
submissions that the Secretariat would have recommended a
factual record if the submission only involved the isolated
examples for which the Council authorized development of factual
records. It appears undisputed at this point that the Council
limited the scope of the factual records the Secretariat
recommended be prepared and that the submitters in each case had
sought. It is unclear whether the Secretariat would have

records . . . .” TEN-YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3. The TRAC also
notes that “JPAC, the NACs, US GAC, academics, independent observers and NGOs
have widely and repeatedly criticized the Council for these actions.” Id.
ENVTL. L. INST. supra note 6, at 10. As ELI notes, the submitters held the view
that the Council Resolutions limited the scope of the factual records and, accordingly,
significantly limited their value. Id. ELI put it a bit more strongly: “Submitters have
openly and vociferously expressed frustration that the factual records do not adequately
address the concerns that prompted their submission.” Id.; see also Wold et al., supra
note 18, at 427-29.
70
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recommended development of factual records of such limited
scope. The Factual Records themselves make this clear. Each
Factual Record provides that:
It should not be assumed that the Secretariat’s Article 15(1)
Notification to Council recommending a factual record for [X]
was intended to include a recommendation to prepare a factual
record of the scope set out in Council Resolution [X], or that the
Secretariat would have recommended a factual record of this
scope.71

Thus, there is a possibility that the Resolutions may require the
Secretariat to develop factual records on matters for which the
Secretariat believes a factual record is not warranted or is
warranted only if part of a larger inquiry.
Finally, the limitations on the scope of the factual record that
the Council imposed in each of the four Resolutions create a
distinct possibility that the Council directed the development of
factual records for asserted failures to effectively enforce that the
submitters themselves would not have considered worth pursuing
through the CEC process. In other words, the submitters would
not have filed submissions that raised such asserted failures to
effectively enforce except as part of more broad-based
submissions that targeted, in the submitters’ views, more
significant government enforcement failures. Indeed, a lawyer for
the submitters of one of the four submissions addressed in the
November Council 2001 Resolutions has made precisely this
claim. Chris Wold, an attorney for the submitters of the Migratory
Birds submission, states in a recent article that:
Without question, the submitters would never have prepared
Migratory Birds if they had known that the Council would, in an
arbitrary and capricious fashion, limit the record to two specific
instances cited only as examples of widespread government
enforcement. The Migratory Birds submitters found the Citizen
Submissions Process attractive only because of its capacity to
investigate the United States’ broad pattern of non-enforcement
of the MBTA.72
71

See the sources cited supra note 68.

Wold et al., supra note 18, at 426. See also Wold et al., supra note 64, at 9 (“By
modifying the scope of factual records and attempting to limit the kind of information
the Secretariat can consider, Council is calling for the preparation of factual records that
no one (except Council) wants. Surely the Citizen Submission Process was not designed
72
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Wold describes the Council’s Resolution concerning the
Migratory Birds submission as “direct[ing] the Secretariat to
develop a factual record... that resembled neither the issues
presented by the submitters nor those recommended for study by
the Secretariat.”73 His colorful characterization is that, for the
Migratory Birds submission, the Factual Record “is the factual
record that nobody wanted.”74 Randy Christensen, an attorney for
the submitters in the B.C. Mining and B.C. Logging submissions
has raised this issue as well, though not as directly.75
The “question of law” that the Council Resolutions raise
involves whether the Council has the legal authority to issue
Resolutions that: (1) dramatically change the focus of the factual
records that the submitters proposed or the Secretariat
recommended; (2) direct the preparation of factual records on
matters for which the Secretariat may believe a factual record is
not warranted or is warranted only if part of a larger inquiry; and
(3) direct the preparation of factual records on matters for which
the submitters appear to believe a factual record is not warranted
or is warranted only if part of a larger inquiry. What conclusions
may be drawn about the legitimacy of the Resolutions in light of
the jurisdictional boundaries the NAAEC has established to
demarcate the parameters for action by each of these actors? Are
the Council’s actions in issuing the four November 2001
Resolutions consistent with the NAAEC’s jurisdictional
boundaries, or do these actions involve inappropriate Council
encroachment onto the terrain reserved for citizen submitters and
the Secretariat?76
to achieve this absurd outcome.”)
73

Id. at 427.

74

Id.; see also WOLD ET AL., supra note 64 at 5.

See, e.g., Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, Sierra Legal Defense
Fund, to Joint Public Advisory Committee 5 (Sept. 8, 2003), reprinted in ENVTL. L.
INST., supra note 6, app. (noting that “the effect of the Council resolution [on the B.C.
Logging submission] was to direct the Secretariat’s attention away from the concerns of
the submitters, and, we believe, the concerns of greatest environmental significance”).
75

76 The Resolutions raise other concerns not addressed in this article. Perhaps of
greatest importance, the Resolutions potentially signal the Council’s view that the citizen
submissions process should be confined to allegations of specific instances of failures to
effectively enforce and exclude allegations of widespread failures to effectively enforce.
Because in many situations widespread failures seem particularly suited to attention on a
regional stage, a move to limit the process in this way would be unfortunate from a
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The Council appears to have taken the position that its
retention of ultimate authority to oversee the NAAEC
encompasses the authority to make decisions about any issue
relating to implementation of the Agreement.77 In Resolution 0009, for example, the Council noted that “countries that are parties
to international agreements are solely competent to interpret such
instruments.”78 More specifically, at least one high-ranking
Canadian official appears to hold the view that the NAAEC “is
very clear that the Council is the ultimate authority for
determining the scope of a Factual Record....”79
By contrast, other commentators have asserted that the text of
public policy standpoint. There also is a strong argument that such a limitation would
represent an inappropriate limitation in the coverage of the process. The Secretariat’s
recommendation concerning the Migratory Birds submission raises this issue, and there
have been several criticisms of the Resolutions on the ground that they inappropriately
narrow the scope of the process. See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v (noting
that:
By defining the scope of the Secretariat’s investigations in each of the four
factual records examined, the Council jeopardized the ability of those records to
fully expose the controversy at issue. Specifically, the Factual records were not
able to address evidence of widespread enforcement failures, cumulative effects
that stem from such widespread patterns, or the broader concerns of submitters
about implementation of Enforcement policies);
Environmental Policy Alert, EPA Backs Narrow NAFTA Inquiry to Resolve
Environmental Dispute (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://www.InsideEPA.com; Environmental
Policy Alert, Parties Vote to Limit NAFTA Environmental Citizens’ Suit Process (Nov.
28, 2001), available at http://www.InsideEPA.com. Similarly, ELI suggests that the
Council’s Resolutions “appear to require submitters to allege specific violations in order
to support the development of a factual record,” and ELI notes that this is likely to be
“burdensome” to submitters. ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v, 13 (noting that
narrowing the scope of the factual record will require submitters to “detail every specific
violation to be included in the Secretariat’s investigation”). A third concern is that the
Resolutions are less transparent than they should be because of the limited Council
explanation of why it rejected the Secretariat’s recommendations that broad-based
factual records be developed, and instead opted for narrowly-focused factual records.
See supra note 50. Fourth, the Council’s decision to direct the Secretariat to prepare and
share work plans for the factual records, and to allow comment on them, also raises
questions about the appropriate allocation of responsibility to administer the factual
record process. ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v.
77

ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15, n. 120.

Article 10(1)(c) and (d) authorizes the Council to “oversee the Secretariat” and
to “address questions and differences that may arise between the Parties regarding the
interpretation of [the] Agreement.”
78

79

ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15, n. 120.
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the NAAEC evinces an intent on the part of the Parties only to
reserve certain powers to administer the citizen submissions
process and an intent to assign certain powers to citizens and to the
Secretariat. These commentators raise the possibility that the
Council’s actions in the form of the four Resolutions may be, or
are, beyond its authority under the NAAEC. For example, in its
2003 study, ELI concluded that the Council’s narrowing of the
scope of factual records “appears to violate the spirit and purpose
of the Agreement.”80 ELI continues that “[t]he Council’s
resolutions, in interfering with the Secretariat’s fact-finding
process by deciding where to shine the spotlight, undermine the
independence of the Secretariat and the ability of the process to
enhance transparent and accountable environmental governance
practices.”81Attorneys for various submitters have reached the
same conclusion. Chris Wold, for example, one of the lawyers for
the U.S. submitters in the Migratory Birds submission,82 has
argued that the Council Resolutions “den[y] the Secretariat its
proper role established by the CEC.”83 Randy Christensen, one of
the lead attorneys for the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (SLDF),
similarly has stated that the Resolutions “contradict the spirit and
intent of the NAAEC.”84 These observers of and participants in
the process argue that the Parties intended to give the Secretariat a
significant degree of independence and to delegate to it authority
for certain decisions, that the Parties have given submitters certain
powers as well,85 and that the Resolutions inappropriately
80

Id. at 14.

81

Id. at 16.

ALLIANCE FOR THE WORLD ROCKIES ET AL., supra note 54, at 11-12 (identifying
Chris Wold as one of the attorneys and law clerks who prepared the submission).
82

83

Wold et al., supra note 18, at 426.

Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, supra note 75, at 3. SLDF’s
lawyers have served as legal counsel for submitters in at least five submissions to date:
BC Hydro, BC Mining, BC Logging, Pulp and Paper, and Ontario Logging. Id. at 1. As
noted above, two of the four November 2001 Council Resolutions (BC Mining and BC
Logging) addressed submissions for which SLDF served as legal counsel.
84

85 See Id. (“[T]he Secretariat must . . . have . . . the independence to exercise its
best professional judgment with respect to Submissions, the adequacy of Party
responses, recommendations to Council and development of factual records”) (citing
JPAC report); TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45 (noting
that “[t]he NAAEC gives the Secretariat a central role to play in the administration of the
process”). Wold et al., supra note 18, at 426 (“The NAAEC . . . grant[s] the Council and
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encroach on the roles the NAAEC cedes to these other key
participants in the citizen submissions process.86
Without purporting to resolve this issue definitively, it seems
indisputable that, at this juncture at least, three years after the
issuance of the Resolutions, there is considerable skepticism,
particularly in the NGO community, concerning the legality and
legitimacy of the Council’s Resolutions. The final Part of this
Article considers some of the possible ramifications of this
skepticism.
IV. Observations and Conclusions
Conceptually, the structure of the citizen submissions process
Secretariat distinct roles and clear boundaries.”).
ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15-16. This author previously raised the
question of whether the Council’s actions were entirely within its authority under the
NAAEC. See Markell, supra note 51, at 208-85. Given the space limitations of that
chapter, the author’s purpose was to highlight that the Resolutions raised this issue,
which the author viewed to be an important one for the future of the citizen submissions
process, and to leave a comprehensive analysis or definitive conclusion for a different
forum. See id. at 285. The author did, however, suggest that the NAAEC does not
allow the Council to act sua sponte to direct the Secretariat to develop a factual record
about an enforcement policy or practice of the Council’s own choosing:
86

The limited conclusion offered here is that the Council lacks the authority under
the NAAEC to act sua sponte to direct the Secretariat to develop a factual
record. The Council does not have the authority, for example, to direct the
Secretariat to prepare a factual record on a particular alleged enforcement
failure, such as an asserted failure to effectively enforce the U.S. Clean Water
Act against a particular facility regulated under that law, unless a submitter first
raises this issue as one warranting such treatment and the Secretariat concurs in
a recommendation to the Council. Instead, the Council only is empowered to
order the Secretariat to develop a factual record concerning particular
enforcement practices and/or policies if a submitter identifies them in a
submission and if the Secretariat determines that development of a factual
record concerning them is appropriate and makes a recommendation to that
effect to the Council.
In short, . . . [it appears that, under the NAAEC], while the Council retains the
authority to veto shining the spotlight in particular directions, the Council
cannot decide on its own where the spotlight should shine. For that affirmative
decision, the Council must follow the lead of civil society, as reflected in the
submissions, and the lead of the independent Secretariat created to administer
the process in a neutral way. A Council failure to respect this limit in the
Agreement on its authority risks serious intrusion into the independent roles that
the Agreement creates for the Secretariat and submitters.
Id. at 284.
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makes it virtually inevitable that a key flashpoint during “regime
implementation” would involve the boundaries of authority of the
different actors.87 In creating the process, the Parties agreed to
serve as the targets of this new international spotlight. At the
same time, they reserved considerable authority over its
operation.88 It seems predictable that the evolution of the spotlight
would be characterized by Party efforts to narrow its scope and by
NGO efforts to extend its reach.
The CEC’s Ten-Year Review and Assessment Committee
(TRAC) noted that the CEC’s “unique” effort among
intergovernmental organizations to combine the Secretariat’s
“traditional service role to the governments that created it” with
“responsibilities where the Secretariat has certain autonomy... “
had led a former CEC executive director to conclude that “the
independent authority on these issues granted by the Agreement to
the Secretariat creates a significant natural tension between the
Secretariat and the Parties.”89 Professor Kal Raustiala similarly
has suggested that the existence of such tension should not be
surprising. Countries do not often embrace “fire alarm” review
mechanisms such as the CEC citizen submissions process, in
which they invest authority to review performance in actors they
cannot control, in part because of concerns about the implications
for state sovereignty as well as the prospect for embarrassment.90
Professor Raustiala also explains that in the particular context
of the NAAEC, the Parties did not embrace a “fire alarm”
approach because of an abiding desire for an international
mechanism intended to invigorate domestic enforcement by

87 NGO participation in international regimes has received considerable attention in
recent years, as opportunities for NGO involvement have increased.
See e.g., Kal
Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997).
88

See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.

89

TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 32.

See Raustiala, supra note 19, at 259. Fire alarms permit private actors to trigger
an investigation much as a private individual can pull a fire alarm to trigger a response
by the appropriate fire officials. Id. at 258. By contrast, a “police patrol” involves
investigations by government officials of situations that might warrant government
response. Id. See Raustiala, supra note 9, at 393-94; Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarm, 28
AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
90
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spotlighting ineffectual domestic enforcement practices or policies
or due to any sense of conviction that such a strategy would be
especially effective in encouraging the Parties to enforce their
environmental laws effectively.91 Instead, they were forced into it
as the price for treaty enactment because of the power of domestic
environmental NGOs, particularly in the United States.92 Thus,
the inclusion of the citizen submissions process does not
necessarily reflect a significant investment by the Parties in the
process or a significant Party commitment to its successful
operation.93
The Resolutions are by no means the first Council forays into
territory that some observers claim is ceded in the Agreement to
other actors.
Virtually since the inception of the citizen
submissions process there has been considerable criticism that the
Council has overplayed its role by limiting the independence and
authority of the Secretariat, thereby weakening the process. The
four CEC-sponsored reviews of the citizen submissions process
have raised concerns about the Parties’ performances.94 The JPAC
91

Raustiala, supra note 19, at 260, 262.

92

Id. at 262.

See supra note 46. The Council frequently has expressed its support for the
process.
See e.g., Resolution 04-03 (noting that the Council is “supportive of the
[citizen submissions] process. . . .)
93

Two reviews covered the entire CEC operations.
One was commissioned
concerning the first four years of the CEC’s operation, “Four Year Review,” Independent
Review Committee, FOUR-YEAR REV. OF THE N. AM. AGREEMENT ON ENVTL.
COOPERATION (1998). The NAAEC had directed that the Parties undertake such a
review. North American Agreement on Evironmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art.
10(1)(b). In 2003, the CEC Council created a Ten-Year Review and Assessment
Committee on the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, which submitted its
report in June 2004. TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3. The
TRAC also concluded that the Secretariat had “contributed to the development of an
adversarial relationship between the Parties and the Secretariat” through its
administration of the process, “particularly at the beginning. . . .” Id. at 45. But the
TRAC, curiously, does not cite to any sources to support this conclusion. Instead, its
only cite after this statement is to a September 2003 letter to JPAC from the Forest
Products Association of Canada which argues for limiting the scope of factual records.
Id. at 45 n.47. JPAC also has undertaken two reviews of the citizen submissions process.
It published the results of the first, which it undertook at the request of the Council, in
2001. Joint Public Advisory Committee, Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 15
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (2001); Matters
Related to Articles 14 and 15 of the Agreement, C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2, June 13, 2000,
para. 5(a), available at http://www.cec.org./files/pdf/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf; TEN94
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also has expressed concerns about the Council’s conduct in a
series of “Advices” it has issued to the Secretariat over the years.95
Other advisory bodies, such as the National Advisory Committees
(NACs)96 and the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC),97
which the Parties have established under the Agreement to advise
them on the implementation of the NAAEC, have also made
known their discomfort with the Parties’ actions in performing
their responsibilities under the process.98 Civil society,99 including
YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 44. JPAC commissioned the
Environmental Law Institute to prepare a second such report in 2003. ENVTL. L. INST.,
ISSUES RELATING TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2003). For more background on the genesis of this
report, and on the process ELI followed in developing it, see ENVTL. L. INST., supra note
6, at v.1.
95 See, e.g., JPAC, Advice to Council no. 99-01, Mar. 25, 1999. The JPAC has
expressed frustration with the Council’s performance of its responsibilities in connection
with the citizen submissions process on numerous occasions, raising a variety of
concerns. See, e.g., Regina Barba, JPAC Chair, to the Council Members, Mar. 24, 2000;
Regina Barba, JPAC Chair, to the Council Members, May 2, 2000 (indicating that the
JPAC is communicating with the Council, “once again,” about “our frustration and
growing unease with how matters relating to Articles 14 & 15 are being managed”).
More recent JPAC Advices evince this frustration concerning the Council’s actions
relating to the specific issues discussed here, among others. Advice 01-09, for example,
requested that the Council authorize a public review concerning the “matter of limiting
the scope of factual records,” among other issues. JPAC, Advice to Council no. 01-09,
Nov. 30, 2001. Additionally, Advice 03-05 “strongly recommends that Council refrain
in the future from limiting the scope of factual records presented for decision by
Secretariat.” JPAC, Advice to Council no. 03-05, Dec. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.cec.org./files/pdf/JPAC/Advice03-05_EN.pdf. See generally John D. Wirth,
supra note 22, at 199. The TRAC, in describing the JPAC’s role, noted that “some
members have . . . interpreted their role to include ‘keeping Council honest’ and ‘helping
maintain Secretariat’s independence.’” TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N,
supra note 3, at 34.
96 Article 17 authorizes each Party to create such a body.
Assessment on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 17.

North American

97 Article 18 authorizes each Party to create such a body. Id. art. 18. As the TRAC
reports, only the United States has created a GAC. TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT
COMM’N, supra note 3, at 36. Canada has created an “Intergovernmental Committee,”
comprised of the federal Environment Minister and the Ministers of the three Canadian
provinces that have signed on to the NAAEC (Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec). Id. at
37.

See, e.g., TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 36.; see
also U.S. Governmental Advisory Committee Letter to Christine Todd Whitman (Oct.
19, 2001) (expressing concern that allowing Parties to define the scope of the factual
record will eviscerate the Secretariat’s independence and the credibility of the
98
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but not limited to the submitter community, also has weighed in
with considerable criticism of the countries’ performance of their
respective roles under the citizen submissions process. Business
Week reported in May 2000 that during that spring, more than 100
NGOs from all three countries charged that the governments were
“working together to undermine” the process.100 A June 10, 2000
Washington Post editorial entitled “How to Wreck Trade”
characterized the submission process as “sound[ing] rather
government-controlled” and continued by criticizing the countries
for “pushing ideas that might strengthen that bias by allowing
governments to intervene in the experts’ fact-finding work.”101
Concerns about the implementation of the citizen submissions
process continue to exist.102 In its 2004 Report, the TRAC noted
that “[t]oday, the relationships among the Parties, the Secretariat
and the JPAC are often strained.”103 The TRAC ascribes some of
this strain to the Council’s role in the citizen submissions process,
noting that many have “expressed concern about the Council
exercising [sic] too much discretion on the administration of
Articles 14/15 where the Secretariat has specific responsibilities
under the NAAEC.... This issue has been an important source of
friction among the Parties, the Secretariat and JPAC and has

submission process); Letter from U.S. NAC to the U.S. Representative to the CEC (May
15, 2000); NAC Advice no. 2000-2 (expressing concern about, inter alia, Council
overreaching); Letter from U.S. NAC to U.S. Representatives to the CEC (Apr. 29,
2002) (characterizing recent actions by the Council as “totally unacceptable and contrary
to both the spirit and the letter [of the NAAEC]”), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocempage/nac/pdf/2002_0429_nac_cec.pdf; Letter from U.S. NAC
to U.S. Representatives to the CEC (Oct. 29, 2003) (“The Council should . . . refrain
from overruling the Secretariat’s recommendations to ensure that the process remains
impartial”),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ocempage/nac/nac_2003_10_
advisoryletter.htm. The TRAC suggests that the NACs “have forced their respective
governments to consider issues that they otherwise might not have (e.g., related to
Articles 14 and 15).”
99

See supra note 12, for a discussion of the definition of “civil society.”

100

Elizabeth Malkin, Taking the Green out of NAFTA, BUS.W., May 29, 2000.

101

Editorial, How to Wreck Trade, WASH. POST, June 10, 2000.

102

See e.g., Tollefson, supra note 47, at 180-81; Wold et al., supra note 18.

TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 30. The TRAC
notes that “the Secretariat complains that the Parties are micromanaging its activities and
inappropriately circumscribing its autonomy (e.g., on Articles 14 and 15).” Id.
103
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colored their relationships.”104
It appears that the Council’s November 2001 Resolutions have
contributed significantly to this unease and frustration.105 For

Id. at 32, 45 (indicating that the Parties “believe that the Secretariat has at times
both extended the process beyond what had been contemplated . . . and overstepped its
authority. . . ”). For the most part, the Secretariat has received positive marks. Id.
(noting that “Submitters and outside observers by and large believe that the Secretariat
has performed its obligations well”); cf. Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process
Under NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement: It’s Easy to Use, But Does It Work?, 26
ENVTL. L. REP. 1003 (1996).
104

An interesting observation concerning the process is contained in a 2001 CSIS/Yale
report:
The issue of citizens’ complaints is presented as both a strength and a weakness
for the CEC. It is a weakness only in the sense that the ample opportunity that
the NAAEC provides for citizens to file environmental complaints against their
governments has proved so contentious in Mexico, and to some extent in
Canada, that at times it has stalled progress in other areas of environmental
policymaking for North America.
In the early years of NAFTA, the Mexican government lacked experience in
making information on government activities available to the public and the
country had only a short track record of involving the public in government
decision-making. In fact, the first-ever public hearings by a Mexican federal
environmental entity occurred only in summer 1991, when the Mexican
environmental agency of that period held hearings jointly with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency on a planned environmental improvement
program for the U.S.-Mexican border area.
Many government officials in all three countries agree that this lack of
experience has created political problems for the CEC’s secretariat, making it
difficult to implement the transparency and citizens’ participation components
of NAFTA’s environmental side agreement, particularly the provisions of
Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC.
JAN GILBREATH, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: PREDICTING A COURSE FOR THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE USING THE NORTH AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 37-38 (June 2001).
One question, for example, involves which entity decides whether information
provided by the submitter is “sufficient” to pass muster under the process. North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 14 (1)(c); see
e.g., TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that “[w]hat
burden of proof a submitter must meet before the Council agrees to the preparation of a
factual record remains an issue for several observers”). Part of this issue involves the
respective roles of the Secretariat and Council in deciding whether the submitter has met
its burden. The Ten-Year Review found that “[t]he Parties need to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of the CEC’s three main bodies . . . as they relate to the cooperative
agenda and the citizens’ submissions process. . . .” Id. at x. The charge of the TRAC
was to “undertake a retrospective of the implementation of the NAAEC over the past ten
years and . . . provide recommendations to the Council for charting a path for the CEC
105

N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.

786

[Vol. 30

example, lawyers with SLDF, which has represented submitters
for several submissions, have stated that “the actions of the
Council... have dramatically reduced the effectiveness and utility
of the process.”106 In a letter to the Canadian NAC, the SLDF
lawyers characterized the Resolutions as a “clear infringement on
the independence of the Secretariat” and suggested that they
“threaten to strip the citizen submission process of its integrity,
utility and legitimacy.”107 Similarly, the submitter for the U.S.
submission that was the subject of one of the Council’s November
2001 Resolutions, the Center for International Environmental Law
(CIEL), sent a letter to JPAC that characterized the narrowing of
the factual records as an “attempt to limit the utility of the citizen
submission process.”108
over the next decade.” Id. at 1. The TRAC is the CEC’s second official review. Id. at
2.
106

Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, supra note 75.

See also Environmental Policy Alert, EPA Backs Narrow NAFTA Inquiry to
Resolve Environmental Dispute, supra note 76.
107

108 Letter from CIEL to JPAC, U.S. Position on Migratory Bird Submission (Oct.
17, 2001), available at http://www.ciel.org/Announce/CEC_JPAC_Letter.html. The
TRAC summarizes other submitter criticisms of the Council as follows: “[S]ubmitters
have also criticized the Parties for not providing information requested by the
Secretariat, for delaying the process, for pre-empting CEC review by engaging in
desultory enforcement actions and for not responding to submitters’ letters.” Id. TENYEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 46. ELI reached the same
conclusion. ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v.

A related question concerns the effect of Council actions on citizens’ interest in the
process. For example, on the “scope” issue that was an important focus of concern with
respect to the Council’s actions regarding the four Resolutions discussed previously, the
CEC’s special legal advisors noted that Council limiting actions of this sort had the
potential to undermine the process and thereby diminish citizen interest in it:
[I]f the scope of factual records continues to be limited to specific alleged
failures to enforce- e.g., a destroyed nest here or a damaged stream bed therethe result is likely to seriously limit the effectiveness of the Article 14-15
process. Moreover, such limitations of factual record scope has the potential to
permanently undermine the integrity of the process to the point where it is of
limited interest to potential submitters. Process integrity and credibility are
critical because it is a public process that relies on and is driven by the
responses and actions of citizens and NGOs in the three countries.
TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45. TRAC notes that:
Some observers have argued . . . that the actions of the Council have eroded the
credibility of the process and are directly responsible for the fact that no new
submissions have been brought against the United States Government in the last
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The experience to date, in short, suggests that the tension that
might have been anticipated for the process has manifested itself
as the process has been implemented and that the Council’s
November 2001 Resolutions have added considerably to the level
of tension and have significantly raised the level of NGO
apprehension about the utility of, and prospects for, the process.109
What are the possible consequences of the Resolutions for the
vigor and viability of the citizen submissions process? The
Resolutions represent another chapter in this ongoing tug and
pull,110 but there is not yet enough information to forecast the
conclusion to the citizen submission story with any great degree of
confidence. It is not yet clear whether the Resolutions signal an
invigorated Council initiative to circumscribe the citizen
spotlight,111 or whether they more accurately should be
four years and that the large environmental NGOs are not using the process.
Id. at 46. Even the TRAC itself felt constrained to conclude that “the Council’s
constraining actions have upset the balance set out in the NAAEC and undermined the
Secretariat’s roles in ways that could compromise the process’s effectiveness and
credibility.” Id. Further, “[t]he public sees the Parties as neither supporting the citizens’
submission process nor the values underlying it.” Id. ELI similarly concluded that the
Resolutions may reduce the use of the process for enforcement concerns involving the
United States, and to some extent Canada, and instead “tilt the distribution
overwhelmingly towards submissions against Mexico,” because the former two countries
have much better domestic processes for handling case-specific enforcement failures.
ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 12. ELI’s prognosis: “As a result, the large majority of
factual records will be about site-specific failures to enforce in Mexico, thus defeating
the tri-national nature of the Agreement.” Id.
109 TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 40 (noting that,
among other things, the CEC today “has less support than could have been anticipated
among its major stakeholder groups (NGOs, business, academia) in the United States for
a variety of reasons. . . . U.S. NGO dissatisfaction with what they see as the Council
weakening the citizens’ submission process . . . has contributed to the detachment”).
TRAC found that, in contrast, “Canadian and Mexican NGOs . . . have valued the
increased transparency that the citizens’ submissions process has brought to specific
issues in each of these countries.” TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra
note 3, at 40.
It is not clear why the TRAC failed to mention Canadian NGO
dissatisfaction with the Council’s actions under the Article 14/15 process.

ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v, 13 (noting that “[m]any commentators
expressed the view that, by intervening in the fact-finding process, the Council is
undermining the independence of the Secretariat and the credibility of the process”).
110

It is, of course, possible that Council initiatives and predilections will be
influenced by domestic policy developments. Jonathan Graubart suggests that the
current U.S. administration may be less supportive of the process than previous
administrations, particularly of an independent Secretariat. Jonathan Graubart, Giving
111
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characterized as opportunistic actions of the Council that respond
to a flurry of Secretariat Recommendations. Gauging the extent
and efficacy of civil society’s response to the Council’s actions
similarly must await future developments.112 Since the inception
of the process, NGOs have given considerable support to it as a
highly innovative feature of international law that has the potential
to enhance domestic governance and accountability.113 In recent
years, several NGO participants, among others, have begun to
offer anecdotal evidence that the process is producing dividends
by triggering improvements in domestic environmental
governance.114 Thus, there appears to be some level of NGO
Meaning to New Trade-Linked ‘Soft Law’ Agreements on Social Values: A Law-inAction Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 425, 460 (2001-2002). This could be significant, since the United States
long has been considered the primary defender of the process among the parties. See
Wirth, supra note 22, at 199. On the other hand, some commentators suggest that the
current Mexican administration is more favorably disposed to support the process than
its predecessor. Graubart, supra at 460.
112 ELI concluded from its study that citizen confidence in the process is tied closely
to the independence of the Secretariat, and that Council actions of the sort represented by
the Resolutions might undermine such confidence:

Interviews with submitters, academic experts, and others have consistently
revealed that the credibility of the citizens’ submissions process stems from the
independence of the Secretariat. There is widespread concern that allowing the
Council to set the terms of the Secretariat’s fact-finding process will undercut
this independence. [I]t is . . . as effective as “the fox guarding the chicken
coop.”
ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 13.
On the other hand, see Markell, supra note 8 (noting that a group of submitters has filed
a similarly broad-based submission concerning mercury emissions from coal-fired power
plants in the United States). Further, the Council has authorized preparation of a broad
Factual Record in connection with the Ontario Logging submission. See supra Part III.
113 Wold et al., supra note 18, at 416. There also have been claims that the citizen
submissions process was not likely to have much effect because of its lack of sanctioning
authority, among other perceived weaknesses in the mechanism, and there have been
criticisms of its performance and impacts. See, e.g., JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 2,
at 34; Kibel, supra note 47, at 474-77; John Kirton, The Commission for Environmental
Cooperation and Canada-U.S. Environmental Governance in the NAFTA Era, 27 AM.
REV. CANADIAN STUD. 459 (1997); Tutchton, supra note 104, at 1003.
114 A real need for systematic research in this area exists, and the JPAC, among
others, has called for incorporating follow-up as a part of the citizen submissions
process. See Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and 15 of the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 16 (2001); Markell, supra
note 17, at 545. Providing a positive gloss is a June 2001 study, GILBREATH, supra note
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investment in and commitment to the process, which makes it
more likely that NGOs will seek through various strategies to
reform the process rather than rush to abandon it as a result of the
Council Resolutions.115 JPAC’s numerous Advices to the Council
104, at 5, 12, 14, 34. At an anecdotal level, evidence is mounting that the process is
adding value in a variety of ways. The process appears to be yielding considerable
information on domestic enforcement practices that might not be developed otherwise.
Further, even for information that already exists, the process is serving as a mechanism
that facilitates organizing this information in a way that is more responsive to citizens’
interests. In addition, there is some evidence that the process has been at least a partial
contributor to more “environmentally-protective” behavior on the part of governments.
See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 11 (noting that “in spite of the narrowed
scope, the factual records examined in this report have proved valuable to a certain
extent” by, inter alia, (1) likely prompting enforcement efforts “in the particular cases
investigated;” (2) “spotlight[ing] problems and generat[ing] negative publicity in the
context of specific cases, sometimes leading the government to address the broader
enforcement concerns giving rise to the specific cases;” (3) “generat[ing] information
about government policies raised in the context of a specific case that may be useful to
submitters in assessing or bringing other cases;” and (4) “put[ting] the public on notice
of the broader enforcement problems alleged by the submitters”). ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT ON NORTH AMERICA’S BORDERS 252 (Richard Kiy & John D. Wirth eds.,
1998); Kibel, supra note 47, at 469-70; Paul Kibel, Awkward Evolution: Citizen
Enforcement at the North American Environmental Commission, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
10769, 10774, 10775 (2002); Geoff Garver, Factual Record Helped in Cozumel Pier
Case, Says Submitter, TRIO Newsletter of the NAAEC (Summer 2001), available at
http://www.cec.org/trio/
stories/index.cfm?varlan=english&ed=4&ID=50; Jamie Bowman, Citizen Submission
Process Proves Valuable in BC Hydro Case, TRIO Newsletter of the NAAEC (Fall
2001), available at http://www.cec.org/trio/stories/index.cfm?ed=5&ID=70&varlan
=english.
115 As an example, any number of possible mechanisms potentially could be
developed for addressing disagreements between the Council and the Secretariat about
the appropriate scope of factual records or ambiguities in Secretariat Recommendations.
One option is that the Council simply must approve or reject a Secretariat
recommendation. See ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 14 (suggesting this as a possible
option). A second would be for the Council to “remand” a recommendation for further
explanation if the Council is not persuaded that a factual record is warranted, at least on
the terms provided in the recommendation. Guideline 10.1 already provides authority
for the Council to make such a request. Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement
Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, Council Res. 99-06, at No. 10.1. For either approach, one issue involves
the appropriate standard for the Council’s review of the Secretariat’s recommendations.
See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15, n.117. (indicating that one commentator
recommends the Council use an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, while another
suggests a “patently unreasonable” standard). Finally, the Secretariat unilaterally could
seek to address some of the issues discussed in the text by proactively specifying in
considerable detail in its recommendations the types of factual records it believes are
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expressing dissatisfaction with the Council’s actions,116 and
submitters’ continued submission of comments concerning the
process,117 suggest at least some level of ongoing engagement. 118
The post-November 2001 filing of several “pattern-based”
submissions, including one involving the United States, is
additional evidence of at least some level of continued “buy-in” by
the NGO community.
Assuming civil society is sufficiently invested to challenge the
Council in situations in which it potentially reduces the value of
the citizen submissions process through actions such as the
November 2001 Resolutions, the “efficacy question” remains,
notably the extent to which civil society will have sufficient
leverage to influence the Parties. As Professor Raustiala has
pointed out, NGO leverage likely was greater prior to the adoption
of NAFTA than it is now, at the implementation stage.119 Thus, an
outstanding question involves the extent to which an engaged civil
society has the leverage to forestall Party actions that potentially
operate to curtail the citizen submissions process.120
Optimists and pessimists alike can find support in the CEC’s
experience for their views about the likely prospects for the citizen
submissions process. On the pessimist’s side, JPAC, among
others, suggests the Council’s actions have produced a loss of
credibility for the process. JPAC has urged the Council to “reestablish public confidence” in the citizen submissions process,121
including by making “every effort to ensure that the independence
of the Secretariat is maintained.”122 There also is the dramatic lack
warranted in connection with particular submissions, and the types that are not.
treatment and consideration of such mechanisms is warranted.
116

See, e.g., JPAC, Advice to Counsel, Nov. 30, 2001, supra note 95.

117

Id.

Fuller

Id. (concerning the recent filing of a submission that asserts a widespread failure
to effectively enforce in the United States). See also supra note 112.
118

119

See Raustiala, supra note 19.

The Council’s Resolution authorizing the Secretariat to develop a broad-based
Factual Record for the Ontario Logging submission might be considered a signal for
optimists.
Pessimists might point to Council concerns about “sufficiency of
information” as a predicate for development of Factual Records. See, e.g., Wold et al.,
supra note 18; Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, supra note 75.
120

121

Advice 04-03.

122

Advice 04-03.
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of proportion in submissions, with very few submissions involving
the U.S. having been filed in recent years.123 Finally, there are
institutional challenges or impediments to effectiveness, such as
the lack of institutionalized follow-up on the information
concerning ineffectual enforcement developed as part of the CEC
process.124 These apparent deficiencies in regime design as well as
the empirical record of implementation should give pause to
analysts predisposed to sing the praises of the process.
Nevertheless, there is support in the CEC’s track record for the
optimist as well. Submitters have continued to use the citizen
submissions process. The trend in submissions has been stable
over the past several years. Further, after a several year hiatus, a
new submission has been filed concerning the United States, thus
suggesting at least some ongoing level of interest in exploring the
possible value of the process for focusing attention on domestic
enforcement practices and policies in this country. Second, while
there is no institutionalized follow-up process, much of the
anecdotal feedback on the process has been quite positive. Thus,
many of the submitters who have used the process appear to
believe that it has helped to engender important changes in
government enforcement behavior.
Finally, there is some
evidence that the Council is somewhat responsive to citizen
concerns. Since the issuance of its November 2001 Resolutions,
the Council has authorized other factual records that are broad in
scope. Further, in its June 3, 2004 letter to JPAC, the Council
expressly “[drew] to JPAC’s attention Council decisions that
provide for broad reviews of enforcement activities.”125 The
Council indicated its view that the resulting factual records “will
undoubtedly provide the public and Parties with a comprehensive
recounting of how enforcement policies are implemented in
practice within a sector and across large geographic areas.”126
Even the skeptic seemingly would concede that letters of this sort
reflect some degree of effort by the Parties to be responsive to the
123 See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Three
Countries Working Together to Protect Our Shared Environment, at http://www.cec.org.
124

See supra note 114.

Letter from Jose Manual Bulas Montroo, Alternate Representative for Mexico,
to Ms. Donna Tingley, JPAC Chair for 2004 (June 3, 2004).
125

126

Id.
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concerns that civil society has raised concerning administration of
the citizen submissions process.
In short, it is too early to tell whether the Resolutions represent
a temporary bump in the road in the emergence of a vibrant citizen
submissions process or a more significant derailment – whether
NGO pressure and interest, creative approaches, and the
responsive instincts of government officials will produce a
convergence of views about the appropriate parameters for the
process that will enable it to find a place of rough equilibrium, or
whether the process will implode either because of Party
discomfort or NGO frustration.127 Because the process is an
experiment in regional governance128 and has the potential to
127

The June 2004 TRAC report reflects the ongoing tension:

After ten years, the main CEC stakeholders, including the Parties, the
Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory committee (JPAC), have not been able
to develop a common vision about the CEC mandate or their respective roles.
These differences have led to considerable friction. The NAAEC’s most
innovative public participation mechanism, the citizens’ submission process,
has become mired in controversy.
Id. at 5.
The TRAC, along the same lines, notes that the citizen submissions process has
“dominated” the CEC agenda, and “strained relations among the Council, JPAC, and the
Secretariat. . . .” Id. at 43. The TRAC found that “[a]t the root of the controversy have
been the strikingly different expectations that citizens and the governments have about
the process.”
Its “advocates” have described the process as “[a] unique and
indispensable role in fostering vigorous environmental enforcement” and as the
NAAEC’s “centerpiece,” while government officials have “sought to circumscribe” the
process for a variety of reasons. TEN-YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3,
at 43. The process could founder because of other concerns as well. For example, the
TRAC noted that the process “has proven more burdensome” than had been “initially
anticipated,” and that the process is “relatively inflexible. . . .” Id.
TRAC noted the importance of this issue to the future of the CEC, noting that,
[T]he heart of the CEC is its institutions – the Council of Ministers, the
Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee. . . . [T]he lack of clarity
as to their respective roles and accountabilities has become increasingly evident.
. . . Concerted action is needed to bring greater clarity to these roles in order to
ensure efficient and effective governance of the CEC.
Id. at 52.
128 In part because of the process, which TRAC describes as an “unprecedented
commitment by the three governments to account internationally for the enforcement of
their environmental laws,” TRAC characterized the CEC as an “international model.”
Id. at ix. It is not the first reviewer to do so. See, e.g., Wold et al., supra note 18, at
416 (“Many had regarded the Citizen Submission Process as a potential model for
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influence domestic policy choices, the answer to these questions
holds considerable interest for those interested in environmental
governance issues in North America and beyond.129

accountability and governance for a new breed of international institutions . . . ”).
(citations omitted).
129 A coalition of environmental groups (the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, and others) has developed a document entitled Principles for
Environmentally Responsible Trade that urges policymakers to “provide a mechanism
for citizens to seek review of failures to enforce health and environmental laws.” It is
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/letter.asp.
TRAC reports that
“[a]necdotal evidence indicates that the process has helped protect environmental
quality,” and it points to several examples of positive impacts of the process, though it
notes that lack of mandatory follow-up to factual records means that benefits have not
been documented systematically. TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note
3, at 46.

Four of the many issues for which the CEC experience may provide insights include: (1)
the extent to which Parties are inclined to be “conservative” in applying or interpreting
commitments made in international agreements; (2) the extent to which international
bureaucracies will be inclined to try to expand their turf over time; (3) how these
tendencies, if they exist, are likely to co-exist; and (4) the extent to which NGOs should
focus on “regime-building” versus implementation. For background sources on some of
these issues, see, e.g., David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-2 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998) (noting
that although “most analysts focus on . . . [treaty] formulation, negotiation, and context[,]
. . . it is not legislation alone, but rather the implementation process that determines
whether a commitment has any practical influence”) (citations omitted); Raustiala, supra
note 19, at 570 (1997) (noting that the use of NGOs will vary depending on whether the
treaty process is in the negotiation or implementation stage).
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